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Merger & Acquisition and Capital 
Expenditure in Health Care: Information 
Gleaned From Stock Price Variation
Wenjing Ouyang, PhD1 and Peter E. Hilsenrath, PhD1
Abstract
Investment, especially through merger and acquisition (M&A), is a leading topic of concern among health care managers. In 
addition, the implications of this activity for organization and market concentration are of great interest to policy makers. 
Using a sample of 2256 firm-year observations in the health care industry during the period from 1985 to 2011, this 
article provides novel evidence that managers learn from financial markets in making capital expenditure (CAPEX) and M&A 
investment decisions. Within the industry, managers in the Drugs subsector are most likely to do so, whereas managers 
in the Medical Equipment and Supplies are least likely to do so. We find informative stock prices improve firm financial 
performance. This article highlights the importance of financial markets for real economic activity in the health care industry.
Keywords
capital expenditure, health care, stock price firm-specific information, market concentration, consolidation, investment, 
health sector, market signals, merger and acquisition
Original Research
Introduction
Investors collect, analyze, and interpret firm-related infor-
mation to create their own private firm-specific information. 
This information can be about the demand for the firm’s 
products or about strategic issues, such as competition with 
other firms.1 Informed investors trade on their private firm-
specific information so that this information is stored in 
stock prices as stock price firm-specific information.2 The 
first present direct evidence that managers learn from this 
information is in capital expenditure (CAPEX) decisions.1 
Stock price firm-specific information significantly increases 
the sensitivity of CAPEX to Tobin’s Q, the stock price–based 
measure of the value of firm fundamentals, suggesting that 
stock price firm-specific information provides managers new 
information in their decision making. In other words, manag-
ers learn from financial markets.1
Some may wonder why outside investors possess firm-
specific information that managers, who run the business 
daily, do not have. We do not argue that managers know less 
than outside investors do. However, it is possible that manag-
ers do not possess every piece of information related to firm 
valuation. A firm’s valuation depends not only on internal 
information about business operations but also on external 
information, such as the state of the economy, the position of 
competitors, the demand by consumers, and so on.3 Outside 
investors discipline the market and related information can 
be useful to managers. Stock prices aggregate many inves-
tors’ information offering considerable firm-specific infor-
mation not known by managers.
Recently, the stream of literature about manager learning 
from financial markets has grown rapidly. It extends from 
CAPEX to cash savings, dividend payments, seasoned equity 
issuance, labor investment, and M&A investment.4-10 These 
studies argue that when stock prices reflect more firm-spe-
cific information, managers make corporate decisions that 
are more aligned with the value of firm fundamentals and 
therefore achieve higher operating performance. Among all 
these studies on stock price informativeness, no such study 
has focused on a particular industry. This article aims to fill 
this gap with a health care focus.
Our research question is whether managers in the health 
care industry learn from financial markets in making 
investment decisions. Insider trading is widely understood, 
but we explore what in some respects is the reverse of insider 
trading, where public information is profitably employed by 
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private parties. We not only examine CAPEX investments 
but also investments through M&A deals. The article goes 
beyond reporting health care specific financial analysis. It is 
translational research with the objective of informing the 
health care management community of relevant develop-
ments in the field of academic finance. It is an effort to cross-
fertilize the silos that too often divide us.
Using a sample of 2256 firm-year observations during the 
period from 1985 to 2011, we find that stock price firm-spe-
cific information increases the sensitivity of both CAPEX 
and M&A to Tobin’s Q. The results provide novel industry-
level evidence to the literature that managers in the health 
care industry learn from financial markets. As the health care 
industry is heterogeneous and includes important subsectors, 
we split the industry into 3 subsectors—Drugs, Health 
Services, and Medical Equipment and Supplies. We find that 
in the Drugs subsector, both CAPEX and M&A investment 
increase sensitivity to Q when stock prices are more informa-
tive. However, this relation holds in M&A investment only in 
Health Services and does not hold at all in Medical Equipment 
and Supplies. After comparing firm characteristics, we find 
that firms in the Drugs subsector have the highest stock price 
firm-specific information and least managerial private infor-
mation. Therefore, managers in a better information environ-
ment are more likely to believe the information creation 
ability of financial markets. In addition, Drug firms are much 
larger than those in the other 2 subsectors, which may moti-
vate managers to learn from the market.
This article is the first to address managerial learning 
from financial markets in the health care industry. Financial 
markets bridge managers with investors who do not always 
have direct communication with management. Previous 
studies show that inside managers possess more firm-spe-
cific information and information flows from inside manag-
ers to outside investors through announcement of 
firm-specific issues such as earnings announcements and 
equity issuance.11,12 We argue that the information flow can 
also be the other way around from outside investors to inside 
managers. Possessing more complete knowledge from finan-
cial markets can help health care managers improve decision 
making.
Data and Methods
We begin our sample collection from the entire universe of 
stocks found in COMPUSTAT/Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. We define the health care 
industry using the health care industry classification in 
Fama-French 12 industry definition. Furthermore, we define 
subsectors following the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) def-
inition in the SIC Manual from US Department of Labor 
online resource. We use SIC codes 2833 to 2836 to define the 
Drugs subsector. This includes the following nomenclature: 
Medicinal Chemicals & Botanical Products, Pharmaceutical 
Preparations, In Vitro & In Vivo Diagnostic Substances, and 
Biological Products. SIC codes 3841 to 3845 are used to 
define Medical Equipment and Supplies. The nomenclature 
here includes the following: Surgical & Medical Instruments 
& Apparatus Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical Appliances 
& Supplies, Dental Equipment & Supplies, X-Ray Apparatus 
& Tubes & Related Irradiation Apparatus, and Electro 
Medical & Electrotherapeutic Apparatus. SIC codes 8000 to 
8099 define Health Services. This nomenclature includes the 
following: Offices & Clinics of Doctors of Medicine; 
Nursing & Personal Care Facilities; Skilled Nursing Care 
Facilities; Hospitals; Medical Laboratories; Home Health 
Care; Misc. Health & Allied Services, NEC; and Specialty 
Outpatient Facilities, NEC. These 3 subsectors compose the 
health care industry. Firms with negative capital expenditure 
or negative acquisition are excluded as are those with less 
than $10 million book value. To avoid extreme values, firms 
with Tobin’s Q greater than 100 or less than zero are excluded. 
Table 1 lists the sample distribution and descriptive statistics 
for the sample of 2256 firm-year observations in the health 
care industry during the period 1985 to 2011.
We measure M&A investment with COMPUSTAT item 
129 and measure CAPEX investment using COMPUSTAT 
item 128.1,13 The main measure of stock price firm-specific 
information is stock return nonsynchronicity (ψ). It equals 
log [(1 − R2) / R2], where R2 derives from specification (1):
 R R R R R Rit ft mt ft jt ft it− = + × −( ) + × −( ) +α β δ ε ,  (1)
where R
it
 is firm i’s daily stock return, R
ft
 is the daily risk-free 
return measured by the 1-month Treasury bill rate, R
mt
 is the 
daily market value-weighted return on all New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and 
National Association of Security Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) stocks (from CRSP), and R
jt
 is the 
daily value-weighted return of the SIC 3-digit industry.
This model is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
controlling for industry return. It splits the variation of a 
stock return into 3 components: a market-related variation, 
an industry-related variation, and a firm-specific variation. 
As prices move in response to new information, stock price 
movements should reflect new market, industry, and firm-
specific information. Under the standard theoretical frame-
work of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, price movements 
should reflect all related information. If there is no public 
news announcement of any kind about a firm, its stock price 
movements are completely attributable to market and indus-
try news. That is, the R2 of the specification (1) shall be 1. 
However, the R2 increases marginally when excluding dates 
when firm-specific news is publicly released, indicating that 
stock return nonsynchronicity (1 − R2) may reflect investors’ 
private firm-specific information.2 Empirical evidence pro-
vides strong support that stock return nonsynchronicity 
increases with informed trading profit and decreases with 
information collection and trading cost, suggesting that it 
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proxies for investors’ private firm-specific information about 
the value of firm fundamentals.14-16
As (1 − R2) is skewed, we employ logistic transformation 
of the ratio (1 − R2) / R2.17 Recent studies employ similar 
measures of stock return nonsynchronicity to proxy for stock 
price firm-specific information.6,14,16-22 We require at least 
100 daily stock return observations during the last fiscal year 
to ensure explanatory power. One concern of our study is 
whether the primary results are sensitive to the particular 
measure of stock price informativeness. In unreported tests, 
we rerun the regressions using the stock return nonsyn-
chronicity including Fama-French 3 factors and the momen-
tum factor in the market model or including lagged market 
and industry returns in the model. We also employ the mea-
sure when cumulating the returns in days where no trading 
took place to account for infrequent trading of daily fre-
quency returns. Our results hold when using these alternative 
measures.
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of market-to-book 
value of assets. The market value of assets is comprised of 
the value of assets in place and the present value of growth 
opportunities. If Tobin’s Q is greater than 1, it suggests that 
the firm has positive net present value growth opportunities. 
Therefore, higher Tobin’s Q suggests a firm has more growth 
opportunities. The Q-theory of investment argues that the 
firm’s investment rate should rise with its Q.23 M&A is 
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
N Mean 25th Median 75th SD
Panel A: Drugs
 M&A 786 10.419 0.945 3.290 12.359 15.841
 CAPEX 786 4.951 2.252 4.105 6.467 4.096
 Q 786 3.318 1.755 2.749 4.110 2.207
 ψ 786 1.864 0.674 1.644 2.809 1.631
 AI 774 2.949 1.309 2.183 3.849 2.428
 Size 786 6.757 4.923 6.675 8.356 2.157
 CF 786 0.165 0.120 0.211 0.296 1.033
 LEV 786 0.442 0.049 0.276 0.626 0.583
Panel B: Health Services
 M&A 665 11.766 1.45 5.392 15.202 15.621
 CAPEX 665 6.861 3.032 5.443 8.609 6.054
 Q 665 2.040 1.247 1.68 2.401 1.261
 ψ 665 1.446 0.089 1.378 2.702 1.874
 AI 665 3.376 1.740 2.723 4.164 2.434
 Size 665 5.991 4.753 5.949 7.257 1.653
 CF 665 0.142 0.095 0.142 0.202 0.238
 LEV 665 0.938 0.207 0.567 1.164 1.213
Panel C: Medical Equipment and Supplies
 M&A 805 9.671 0.869 3.492 11.634 14.722
 CAPEX 805 5.052 2.328 4.095 6.487 4.008
 Q 805 2.613 1.536 2.168 3.183 1.631
 ψ 805 2.258 1.109 1.944 3.258 1.634
 AI 805 3.466 1.611 2.732 4.553 2.554
 Size 805 5.763 4.510 5.651 6.927 1.635
 CF 805 0.138 0.105 0.168 0.237 0.319
 LEV 805 0.370 0.020 0.190 0.519 0.532
Panel D: Whole Healthcare Industry
 M&A 2256 10.549 1.056 3.923 12.878 15.401
 CAPEX 2256 5.550 2.502 4.397 7.138 4.804
 Q 2256 2.690 1.454 2.148 3.322 1.837
 ψ 2256 1.882 0.667 1.704 2.983 1.737
 AI 2256 3.260 1.531 2.608 4.198 2.485
 Size 2256 6.176 4.712 6.030 7.479 1.888
 CF 2256 0.069 0.102 0.171 0.249 0.659
 LEV 2256 0.563 0.054 0.316 0.694 0.844
Note. Drugs, Health Services, and Medical Equipment and Supplies are 3 subsectors in the health care industry. Other than M&A and CAPEX, variables 
are collected in the previous fiscal year. Detailed descriptions of all variables and data sources are provided in the supplementary material. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. M&A = merger and acquisition; CAPEX = capital expenditure; CF = cash flow; LEV = leverage.
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Table 2. Price Informativeness and Merger Investment Sensitivity to Q.
Panel A: Whole sample regression
CAPEX M&A Total investment
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Q 0.436*** 0.159 0.122 0.568*** 0.110 0.027 1.057*** 0.226 0.100
(.000) (.117) (.293) (.004) (.716) (.938) (.000) (.522) (.810)
ψ × Q 0.139*** 0.123** 0.229* 0.253* 0.425** 0.445**
 (.005) (.015) (.089) (.077) (.014) (.012)
ψ −0.380** −0.348** −0.631 −0.711 −1.064* −1.158**
 (.013) (.023) (.181) (.126) (.059) (.031)
AI × Q 0.017 0.012 0.024
 (.451) (.874) (.790)
AI 0.009 −0.182 −0.200
 (.891) (.422) (.454)
CF 0.938*** 0.951*** 0.930*** 1.606*** 1.629*** 2.013*** 2.584*** 2.631*** 3.093***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
LEV 0.194 0.199 0.183 −0.462 −0.455 −0.374 −0.329 −0.334 −0.247
(.205) (.185) (.236) (.254) (.261) (.366) (.472) (.461) (.594)
Size −0.134 −0.143 −0.117 −1.245*** −1.261*** −1.347*** −1.435*** −1.414*** −1.504***
(.110) (.139) (.229) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant 7.197*** 7.940*** 7.795*** 18.817** 20.055** 20.859*** 26.340*** 28.187*** 29.084***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.015) (.012) (.009) (.001) (.000) (.000)
N 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256
R2 .1388 .1448 .1446 .0492 .0508 .0544 .0556 .0594 .0643
Panel B: Regression in each health care industry
 Drugs Health Services Medical Equipment and Supplies
 CAPEX Merger Total CAPEX Merger Total CAPEX Merger Total
ψ × Q 0.099** 0.434** 0.601** 0.179 1.434*** 1.804*** 0.110 −0.224 −0.065
(.044) (.025) (.012) (.416) (.001) (.001) (.325) (.423) (.884)
N 786 786 786 665 665 665 805 805 805
R2 .2580 .0737 .0773 .1447 .1375 .1404 .1899 .0880 .1059
Note. Panel A presents OLS coefficient estimates of corporate investment in health care industry firms from 1985 to 2011. The dependent variable 
is CAPEX in the first 3 columns, M&A investment in the next 3 columns, and total investment in the last 3 columns. Panel B reports the coefficient 
estimates of ψ × Q in each industry sector using the same regression model as in Panel A. Detailed descriptions of variables are in the supplementary 
material. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. In every regression, we control for year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are P values 
based on the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm level clustering. CAPEX = capital expenditure; M&A = merger and acquisition; 
OLS = ordinary least square.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
investment through purchase of second-hand assets from the 
target firm and empirical neoclassical studies report that 
these investments also increase with Q.13,24
Because M&A investment can be initiated by manage-
rial private information, we control for managerial private 
information with earnings’ surprise data.1,11,12 This variable 
is defined as the average of absolute abnormal return (−1, 
+1) around previous 4 quarterly earnings announcements. 
A positive absolute earnings’ surprise reveals that there is 
some information in earnings not fully anticipated by the 
market and hence not held in prices yet. Because managers 
presumably know the accounting numbers beforehand, the 
earnings’ surprise can be a reasonable measure of manage-
rial private information. We control for firm size since 
smaller firms tend to have higher stock return nonsyn-
chronicity and they are less likely to have resources other 
than equity to finance large acquisitions. We need to address 
the concern that our main results are not driven by the firm 
size effect. We also include controls of firm leverage and 
cash holdings as high leverage can lead to underinvestment 
and excess cash flow can cause over-investment.25,26 All 
these variables are measured at the previous fiscal year. The 
supplementary material provides a detailed explanation of 
each variable.
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Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents basic statistics for the main variables in each 
health care subsector as well as in the whole health care 
industry. The average M&A investment accounts for 10.55% 
of total book assets in the health care industry. Health 
Services has the highest M&A investment (11.77%), signifi-
cant at 1% level. The average CAPEX investment accounts 
for 5.55% of book assets in the health care industry, much 
lower than M&A investment. Among the 3 subsectors, 
Health Services has higher CAPEX investment, significant 
at 1%. Tobin’s Q is highest in the Drugs and lowest in Health 
Services, significant at 1%. Stock return nonsynchronicity is 
highest in Medical Equipment and Supplies. However, as it 
is negatively correlated with firm size (coefficient, −0.66; P 
< .01), we split firm size and rank stock return nonsyn-
chronicity into quintiles. The average ranking of stock return 
nonsynchronicity in Drugs becomes the highest, and signifi-
cant at 1%. Firms in the Drugs category have the biggest 
size, lowest managerial private information, and highest cash 
flow. Firms in Medical Equipment and Supplies have the 
lowest leverage ratio. It is important to note the heterogene-
ity of the 3 subsectors. The Drugs subsector enjoys patent 
protection for much of its revenue and is very much a 
for-profit arena. To some extent, this applies to Medical 
Equipment and Supplies as well. But Health Services com-
petes differently and includes a substantial nonprofit element 
which is not directly observed in this study because of the 
nature of our data.
Table 2 presents estimation results from ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions. Panel A reports the whole sam-
ple. Results show both CAPEX and M&A investments 
increase with Q. Stock price informativeness (ψ) increases 
sensitivity of internal capital investment to Q, suggesting 
managers learn from financial markets in making CAPEX 
investment. Moreover, ψ increases sensitivity of M&A 
investment to Q, suggesting managers learn from financial 
markets in making M&A investment decisions. The coeffi-
cient of managerial private information and Q (AI × Q) is not 
statistically significant. The last 3 columns of Table 2 show 
total investment also becomes more sensitive to Q because of 
higher stock price informativeness.
Panel B in Table 2 shows estimation results in each indus-
try subsector. Due to limited space, we only report the coef-
ficient estimates of ψ × Q using the same regression models 
as in panel A. These regression models are models (3), (6), 
and (9). In the Drugs category, findings indicate managers 
learn from financial markets in both CAPEX and M&A 
investments. This observation is not surprising as Table 1 
shows firms in this subsector have the largest size, highest 
stock price informativeness, and lowest managerial private 
information. Managers in Health Services appear to only 
learn from the market in making M&A investment decisions. 
Managers tend to be more receptive to financial markets in 
making these strategic decisions perhaps because Health 
Services has the highest level of M&A investment. In 
Medical Equipment and Supplies, stock price informative-
ness does not affect the sensitivity of CAPEX or M&A to Q.
If managers learn from financial markets, we would expect 
more informed decisions aligned with firm fundamentals and 
improved future firm performance. In Table 3, we test the rela-
tion between stock price firm-specific information and future 
operating performance including return-on-asset (ROA), sales 
increase, and asset turnover. ROA measures total asset profit-
ability, Sales Increase measures sales revenue growth, and Asset 
Turnover measures total asset management efficiency. We did 
not use ψ × Q but ψ directly because managerial learning should 
benefit firm performance for both high and low Q firms. For 
high Q firms, managerial learning helps to increase investment 
to achieve growth opportunities; for low Q firms, managerial 
learning helps to curb overinvestment, which also helps to 
improve firm performance. We find that stock price firm-spe-
cific information consistently increases future operating perfor-
mance. This observation is consistent with the managerial 
learning argument. In unreported tests, we find that stock price 
firm-specific information increases future asset turnover and 
ROA, respectively, in Drugs and Health Services, supporting 
the argument that manager learning improves future firm per-
formance. In Medical Equipment and Supplies, we find that 








 (1) (2) (3)
Q 0.575*** 1.001** −0.063
(.001) (.015) (.938)
ψ 0.345* 1.094** 2.083**
(.086) (.024) (.011)
AI 3.555 7.230 49.637
(.649) (.676) (.183)
Size 0.077* −0.225** −0.310
(.087) (.029) (.143)
CF 3.439*** −5.747*** 6.089***
(.000) (.004) (.001)
LEV −0.228 −1.890*** 1.928
(.469) (.002) (.122)
Constant −4.610*** 21.026*** 86.468***
(.000) (.001) (.000)
N 2089 2093 2090
R2 .1092 .0783 .0633
Note. This table shows regression results of future firm performance and 
stock price informativeness in the whole health care industry. Detailed 
descriptions of variables are in the supplementary material. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. In every regression, we control 
for year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are P values based on 
the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted for firm level 
clustering.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
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stock price firm-specific information increases future sales 
growth even though Table 2 does not show evidence of manager 
learning. Results suggest stock price informativeness affects 
future firm performance through channels other than manager 
learning from the market.27-29
Conclusions
This article presents new evidence that managers in health 
care learn from financial markets in making organizational 
decisions about CAPEX and M&A investment. We find both 
CAPEX and M&A investment become more sensitive to Q 
when stock prices are more informative of firm-specific 
information. Results suggest financial markets provide man-
agers new information about the value of firm fundamentals 
so that managers are more likely to invest through M&A and 
CAPEX when informed stock prices are higher. Further anal-
ysis shows managerial learning from financial markets 
improves future firm operating performance. Among the 3 
industry subsectors, managers in the Drug subsector are most 
likely to learn because firms in this sector have the highest 
stock price information and lowest managerial private infor-
mation. Managers in Health Services tend to learn only for 
M&A investment. This subsector also has the highest per-
centage of investment through M&A.
There is much concern about consolidation and market 
power in health care, especially in the wake of the Affordable 
Care Act which facilitates clinical and financial integration. 
The purpose of integration is to improve efficiency and 
avoid “tragedy of the commons” thought to be behind 
poor cost and outcome performance in the United States.30 
Unfortunately, integration is also associated with consolida-
tion and higher levels of market power. The result may yield 
greater productive efficiency but higher allocative ineffi-
ciency.31,32 Economists and others have been concerned 
about social welfare and monopoly since at least the time of 
Adam Smith. Yet, most of the related literature, especially in 
health care, does not fully explore mechanisms by which 
managers invest and acquire to gain efficiency in production 
and/or market power. This article helps fills the void and may 
serve to stimulate further research in this arena.
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